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Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory 
 
Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part we explain the concept of mental 
fictionalism. In the second part, we present the various versions of fictionalism and their main 
sources of motivation. We do this because in the third part we argue that mental fictionalism, 
as opposed to other versions of fictionalism, is a highly undermotivated theory. 
 
 
What is mental fictionalism? 
 
We can distinguish between realist and antirealist approaches regarding each type of entity. 
You are a realist if you think that the entities of the type in question exist, and you are an 
antirealist if you think that they do not. You can be a realist about universals, physical objects, 
abstract entities and so on, while you remain an antirealist for example about God, scattered 
objects or finkish dispositions. 
 
However, we need to distinguish how the realist or the antirealist approaches the ontological-
metaphysical issues from how he approaches discourse. The focus of this latter distinction is 
not on the existence or non-existence of some entities, but on the features of our mode of 
speech about these entities. 
 
According to Kalderon (2005, 95-113.), three distinct conditions have to be satisfied in order 
to be a realist about a discourse. (1) The sentences of the discourse express propositions about 
the putative subject matter of the discourse. (2) In uttering these sentences, we assert the truth-
conditions of the appropriate propositions. (3) At least most of these propositions are true – 
you are justified in accepting them. 
 
In accordance with orthodoxy, we call the discourse about the mental ‘folk psychology’. So, 
the three conditions of discourse about folk psychology are the following: (1) Sentences of 
folk psychology express propositions about mental facts. (2) In uttering sentences of folk 
psychology, we assert the truth-conditions of the appropriate propositions, namely the 
obtaining of mental facts. (3) Most of these propositions represent mental facts correctly, so 
they are mostly true.
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You are antirealist about folk psychology if you deny the satisfaction of at least one of the 
above conditions. Consequently, there are three possible antirealist positions. 
 
Mental non-factualism denies the first criterion. According to this position, sentences of folk 
psychology do not express propositions. One could argue for this claim from some semantic 
and ontological considerations. Maybe you accept some form of verificationism, and you 
think there are no exact verificational criteria in the case of these sentences, so they are 
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 Naturally we mean that general propositions of folk psychology are mostly true. The realist should not commit 
herself to the view that most particular mental-state attributions based on folk psychological generalizations are 
true or correct. She can hold for example that it is difficult to make correct attributions, so most people are wrong 
in it – with the possible exception of psychologists. 
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meaningless. Or maybe, you simply think there are no mental entities and consequently, the 
referring terms of folk psychology are empty, which means that a component of the putative 
proposition is missing, and therefore, there is no proposition. Again, you can think the same 
about the predicates of folk psychology: since mental properties are not instantiated, there are 
no semantic counterparts of these predicates. 
 
Eliminativism denies the third criterion. In contrast to the non-factualist view, eliminativism 
says that the sentences of folk psychology express propositions, but these propositions are 
systematically false. In other words, propositions of folk psychology have representational 
content, but this content represents our minds falsely. So, eliminativism is an error-theory of 
mind; it renders our beliefs about the mental definitely incorrect. Eliminativism is obviously 
not ontologically innocent either; it is committed to the non-existence of mental facts posited 
by folk psychology. 
 
It seems to us that the difference between the non-factualist and the eliminativist view heavily 
depends on some shaky semantic intuitions. Consider the famous debate between Bertrand 
Russell (Russell 1905) and Peter Strawson (Strawson 1950) about sentences containing empty 
names or definite descriptions. If you have a Russellian intuition, you will claim that these 
sentences express false propositions, but if you have Strawsonian ones, you will take these 
sentences as expressing no propositions at all, because their existential presupposition is not 
satisfied. Likewise, if you think there are no semantic counterparts of at least one 
compositional part of a sentence about the mental, then you have two choices. If you have 
Russellian intuitions, you will tend to accept the eliminativist view, but if you have 
Strawsonian intuitions, you will find the non-factualist view more compelling. 
 
Mental fictionalism denies the second criterion. In contrast to non-factualism, it claims that 
the sentences of folk psychology do express propositions, but when we utter these, we do not 
assert these very propositions. In other words, we do not use the sentences of folk psychology 
to assert the truth-conditions of their propositional content, and when accepting these 
sentences, we do not express any cognitive attitude (belief) about their propositional content. 
Furthermore, in contrast to eliminativism, the mental fictionalist view does not deny the 
obtaining of mental facts. According to this view, it is irrelevant whether the facts posited by 
folk psychology obtain or not, since the purpose of this discourse is not to give an account of 
mental facts. 
 
Prima facie, mental fictionalism is ontologically innocent: its goal is not to make 
commitments to the existence or non-existence of any facts or entities. In contrast to the other 
two positions though, it makes no claim about the content of folk psychological sentences or 
about the ontological status of their subject matter. Mental fictionalism makes claims only 
about the use or role of these sentences. More specifically, it claims that in uttering a folk 
psychological sentence, we only quasi-assert the propositional content thereof, whilst actually 
doing something else. 
 
What else do we do? There are four known answers to this question (see: Eklund 2011; 
Kalderon 2005, 119-129; Yablo 2001). The first two answers claim that we do not assert 
anything when we quasi-assert such a sentence. The other two answers claim that we do assert 
some proposition in these situations, but not those ones which constitute the semantic content 
of these sentences. 
 
3 
 
The first non-assertive version is called instrumentalism. Instrumentalism claims that in 
uttering a sentence of folk psychology, we do not make any assertive speech acts. Maybe the 
instrumentalist states that we make speech acts with other illocutionary force, for instance, we 
evaluate our fellows’ or our own behaviour; we express our emotions regarding somebody or 
something; we try to bring out some attitude in our audience, etc. (see: Demeter 2009; Morton 
2003). Or maybe, the instrumentalist does not characterize positively what kind of speech acts 
we make and only states that they serve some larger purpose (see: Yablo 2001). In short, the 
sentences of folk psychology are just tools or instruments for achieving some purpose. 
 
The second non-assertive version of quasi-assertion is figuralism. According to this view, in 
uttering a sentence of folk psychology, we do not make any literal, not to mention assertive, 
speech acts, but rather, we speak figuratively.
2
 That is, we do not assert or evaluate or express 
anything, we just “make as if to say something” (Grice 1989: 34), and while doing this, we 
characterize the subject matter of folk psychology with figurative representational aids. 
 
Let’s see the assertive versions, which all claim that we do assert something by uttering folk 
psychological sentences, but this something is not their propositional content. The first one of 
these assertive versions states that in uttering a sentence of folk psychology, we make an 
assertion about the content of a fiction. So, in uttering a sentence like “She believes that p” or 
“She desires that p”, we make the following assertion: “According to the fiction of mental 
states, she believes that p or she desires that p”. This is the metafictionalist or metalinguistic 
view of quasi-assertions. 
 
According to the second assertive view, in uttering a sentence of folk psychology, we do 
make an assertion, moreover, an assertion about the real world and not about a fiction, but not 
about the proposition expressed by the sentence. Rather, we assert those real-world conditions 
which make it true that according to the fiction, things are so and so (see Dennett 1987). Since 
from this point of view we make an assertion about the objects of the real world, it is called 
the objectualist view. 
 
To sum up, if we commit ourselves to any of these theoretical positions about the nature of 
quasi-assertion, we are mental fictionalists in the following sense: 
 
Mental fictionalism =df In uttering a sentence of folk psychology, we do not assert the 
truth-conditions of the propositional content of the sentence. 
 
On the other hand, in accepting these sentences, we do not express any cognitive attitude 
(belief) about their propositional content. In the course of such an utterance, we just quasi-
assert the propositional contents of our folk psychological sentences, while in doing so, we do 
not assert anything (but do something else), or we assert the truth-conditions of other 
propositions. 
 
 
The main motivation for fictionalism 
 
A fictionalist interpretation can be suggested for all kinds of discourse concerning any kind of 
entity. The question is always whether it is worth being a fictionalist about discourse. 
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Our claim is the following: two conditions must be satisfied in order to motivate fictionalism 
about some discourse. (1) We can doubt the existence of the appropriate type of entity, and (2) 
nevertheless, due to some pragmatic considerations, we do not want to give up the discourse 
in question. 
 
There can be more than one kind of doubt about the subject matter of a discourse. We can 
simply think that the relevant entities do not exist. However, we do not have to commit 
ourselves to this strong antirealism. It is sufficient that, according to the conclusion of the 
well-known Oracle-argument (see e.g.: Eklund 2005, 559-561.), we can consistently uphold 
that the antirealist ontology is true, but even that is not necessary: it is sufficient to proceed 
from the thesis that existential questions are too difficult to answer, so we have good reason to 
be agnostic about the existence of the relevant objects.
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Let’s assume that we are committed to one of these sceptical attitudes. Let’s also assume that 
we believe that we must hold on to the discourse in question for some reason. For example, it 
is so deeply rooted in our everyday use of language that it would be hopeless to give it up, or 
it has such irretrievable profit that giving it up would be explicitly damaging. 
 
Now, if both conditions are fulfilled in connection with some discourse, fictionalism about it 
is well-motivated. Moreover, it is our only possibility. 
 
It is obvious that we cannot be realists. One of the criteria of the realist interpretation of a 
discourse is that the sentences of it are mostly true, so realism is inconsistent with the 
acceptance of the sceptical attitude. Therefore, the first condition is not fulfilled. 
 
This is not so with non-factualism and error-theory. Naturally, these are consistent with the 
sceptical attitude. What is more, as Kalderon (2005, 142-3) says: every antirealist approach 
about a discourse arises from some kind of scepticism. However, these two theories are not 
interested in preserving the discourse, therefore, the second condition is not fulfilled in their 
case. 
 
This is quite clear. If you are an error-theorist, you will claim that the speakers of the relevant 
discourse are always wrong (or at least, we have good reason to suspect that they are), 
whenever they assert or accept a sentence of the discourse. According to the error-theorist, 
these speakers have false epistemic intuitions. 
 
If you are a non-factualist, you will claim that the relevant discourse is seemingly made up of 
fact-stating, propositionally contentful sentences, but it is not. In other words, though the 
sentences of the discourse seem to be meaningful, they are really not, and they only express 
contentless pseudo-statements. In short, the non-factualist claims that the speakers of the 
discourse have false semantic intuitions. 
 
In sum, the antirealist in these two cases holds that the sentences of the relevant discourse are 
either false or meaningless. Consequently, she is self-consistent only if, due to her sceptical 
attitude, she proposes to give up the discourse. She is prompted to do this for pragmatic 
reasons; one must not literally say something which one thinks to be false or meaningless. 
Remember Grice’s famous maxims (Grice 1989: 27): „Do not say what you believe to be 
false!” (the first maxim of Quality) and „Be perspicuous!” (the supermaxim of Manner)! It 
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would be superfluous even if she would try to reform our – from her point of view – false 
intuitions about the discourse. This manoeuvre would make it even clearer that we should 
give up the discourse in question. 
 
The fictionalist goes against both of these antirealist views. In contrast to the error-theorist, 
she does not commit herself to the falsity, or even to the queerness of the propositions about 
the subject matter of the discourse. Rather, she proposes to interpret the discourse in such a 
way that in uttering its sentences, we really do not assert any truth or falsity about the subject 
matter of the discourse. In contrast to the non-factualist, she does not question our 
fundamental semantic intuitions. She can argue that, because the above-mentioned doubts are 
well founded, we should understand the discourse in such a way that we really do not use 
these fact-stating, propositionally contentful sentences for asserting any true or false 
statements about the subject matter of the discourse. Indeed, in opposition to the realist and 
the two rival antirealist theories, fictionalism is the only theory which can adhere to the 
preservation of a discourse while being sceptical about the type of entities the discourse 
postulates. 
 
Let’s see three examples. Firstly, let us take the discourse about possible worlds. In this case, 
both conditions are apparently satisfied. We have strong doubts about the existence of 
possible worlds; we are unwilling to accept both genuine modal realism, according to which 
there are possible worlds and they are genuine worlds like ours (see: Lewis 1973, 1986), and 
ersatz modal realism, according to which there are possible worlds, but they are just abstract 
entities which represent or correspond to the ways our world might have been (see e.g.: 
Plantinga 1974, 1976/2004). 
 
However, even though we have these strong doubts, we do not want to give up the discourse 
about possible worlds, because it is the best heuristic device to model our ordinary modal 
intuitions. If we were to commit ourselves to an error-theory about the possible world 
discourse, we would have to say the following: philosophers, logicians and linguists literally 
go wrong every time they speak about possible worlds, therefore we cannot accept this 
discourse. But we cannot accept it either if we are non-factualists. In this case, we would have 
to say that the speakers of this discourse produce meaningless strings of signs. Consequently, 
based on our common sense doubts and the fact that we need the possible world discourse, 
our commitment to modal fictionalism is well-motivated (see e.g. Rosen 1990, Nolan 2011). 
Accepting for example the metafictionalist version of it, we could say that „According to the 
fiction of possible worlds, there exists a possible world where Garri Kasparov is a composer.” 
 
Secondly, let us see the discourse of mathematical (arithmetical) statements. We have weaker 
intuitions about mathematical entities; however, the question of their existence or non-
existence is surely difficult to answer, so it seems reasonable to be agnostic about it. 
 
On the other hand, we would like to give up mathematical discourse even less than we want to 
give up the possible world discourse. It is not just an excellent tool for achieving some 
purpose, but also an integral part of our ordinary language, so giving it up seems to be 
hopeless. However, only the fictionalist interpretation of this discourse can jointly accept the 
sceptic (or agnostic) motivation and the intention to preserve the discourse. Error-theory and 
non-factualism make it impossible to adhere to the discourse, just as it is in the case of the 
possible world discourse, and exactly for the same reason. Therefore, the fictionalist 
interpretation is well-motivated in this case as well. 
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Our third example is moral discourse, where our sceptical intuitions are rather waxy. 
However, it is clear that one can coherently think of a possible world where no moral 
properties, facts, or values exist, and there are arguments for the claim that our world is such a 
world (see e.g. Mackie 1977). 
 
So the sceptic attitude is also present in the case of moral discourse, but just as in the former 
two examples, we have good reason not to give up this discourse either. Moral speech is at 
least as integral part of our ordinary language as the arithmetic one. The sceptic and the 
discourse-preserving motivation can be reconciled only by the fictionalist interpretation in the 
case of this discourse, just as in the case of the former examples and due to the same 
considerations. So, the fictionalist interpretation is also well-motivated here.
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As we noted earlier: you cannot rule out that fictionalism could be well-motivated in the case 
of any discourse about any type of entity. For example, we can imagine horrible dictu that 
fictionalism about physical objects will emerge in the future. Say, if more and more 
philosophers accept mereological nihilism and think that there are no mereologically complex 
objects, but only mereologically simple ones. According to this view, there are no tables just 
mereological atoms organized in a table-way (see e.g. van Inwagen 1990). As a matter of fact, 
we think that such a view will inevitably emerge sooner or later.
5
 We would have strong 
enough doubts about the existence of complex objects, but we would be absolutely unwilling 
to give up speaking about physical objects. 
 
 
Why is the case different with mental fictionalism? Why is mental fictionalism 
undermotivated? 
 
Let’s have a look at the three plus one examples above again. These examples show that the 
motivation for being fictionalist about various discourses has degrees. For example, it is more 
motivated to commit ourselves to fictionalism about the discourse of possible worlds than 
about the discourse of physical objects. It is more motivated, since while we are strongly 
unwilling to commit ourselves to the existence of possible worlds (whether they are concrete 
or abstract entities) because of our ordinary or common sense ontological point of view, from 
the same point of view we have the basic conviction that well-known physical objects do 
exist. Therefore, while the mode of speech concerning possible worlds is in opposition to our 
everyday ontology, the one concerning physical objects is in line with it. Consequently, while 
the fictionalist interpretation of the possible world discourse is acceptable for common sense 
considerations (it is easy to see theoretical reasons why it is needed), the fictionalist 
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 It is possible to make a further distinction in all cases of fictionalism. According to the degree of discrepancy 
between the common sense intuitions of the users of the discourse and the theoretical intuitions of the fictionalist 
philosopher, a fictionalist can either propose hermeneutic or revolutionary fictionalism (see: Stanley 2001; 
Eklund 2011). If the degree of discrepancy is rather small, then even hermeneutic fictionalism could be 
plausible, which claims that because the speakers of the discourse also have sceptical or agnostic attitudes about 
the subject matter of the discourse, it is reasonable to think that they have always used the discourse in a 
fictionalist spirit. On the other hand, if the discrepancy of the intuitions is large, then the fictionalist should 
propose the revolutionary version: though the speakers of the discourse have used the discourse in a realist spirit, 
we have to stop this practice and use the discourse in the fictionalist spirit from now on. We think the 
hermeneutic kind of fictionalism could be plausible in the case of possible worlds and maybe mathematical 
discourse, while in the case of moral discourse, the revolutionary one seems to be more attractive. Nevertheless, 
this distinction plays no part in our argument, since it concerns of various versions of fictionalism only insofar as 
all kinds of them depend on some kind of sceptical reasons, at least on the part of the theorist. So, we will not 
mention it in the foregoing. 
5
 What is more, it has already emerged. See: Dorr – Rosen (2002). 
7 
 
interpretation of the physical object discourse is much less acceptable for these (at least 
presently). 
 
We can gain a methodological principle from all of this. If the manifest picture of a discourse 
supports the realist interpretation, then the burden of proof is on the adherents of antirealist 
interpretations, including fictionalism. In other words, if an antirealist interpretation is in 
contrast with the manifest picture of a discourse, then the burden of proof is on the antirealist. 
Focusing on fictionalism, if it contradicts the manifest image, then the adherent of this view 
has to persuade us that doubts about the existence of the subject matter of the discourse are so 
serious that we must free the utterances of sentences of the discourse from any ontological 
burden in order to preserve it. If she does not succeed in doing this, that is, she cannot raise 
serious enough doubts in us about the existence of the subject matter of the discourse, the 
fictionalist theory will turn out to be undermotivated. 
 
Now, we take it to be evident that the manifest image of folk psychological discourse is realist 
regarding mental entities. Our claim then is the following: the mental fictionalist cannot raise 
serious doubts about the existence of mental entities, therefore, in harmony with the 
fictionalist interpretation of the discourse about physical objects and in contrast to the 
fictionalist interpretation of the possible world discourse, the fictionalist interpretation of folk 
psychology is undermotivated. 
 
Our argument is based on the following two theses: 
 
(1) The existence of conscious experiences does not raise any difficult ontological 
questions. 
(2) Conscious experiences constitute the totality, or at least the paradigmatic 
representative core of mental entities described by folk psychology. 
 
Let’s see (1). By conscious experiences, we mean kinds of events which have phenomenal 
character or subjective quality. To use a phrase introduced by Thomas Nagel (Nagel 1974), 
they are events, in the case of which ‘there is something it is like’ to undergo them. There is 
without any doubt something it is like for us to undergo pain. There is without any doubt 
something it is like for us to perceive a red tomato, and it is not the same as perceiving a green 
salad. There is without any doubt something it is like for us to undergo anxiety, and it is not 
like fearing something. Our conscious experiences are constituted by these qualities (i.e. a 
conscious experience is none other than an event with a determinate phenomenal quality). 
Therefore, since it is a brute fact that there are events with such phenomenal character, the 
existence of conscious experiences is not doubted at all. 
 
A further feature of conscious experiences is that in their case, it is impossible to distinguish 
between how they appear to us and what they really are, because conscious experiences are 
constituted by the way they appear to us (see e.g. Kripke 1980, 144-155). So, neither the 
existence, nor the phenomenal nature of conscious experiences raises any doubt. 
 
Obviously, the mental antirealist can say that our philosophical concepts about this likeness 
are confused (see Dennett: 1990), but she can say only this much. However, it does not affect 
either the existence of conscious experiences (that we have conscious experiences), or their 
fundamental nature (the way they appear to us). 
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Now, conscious experiences are subject matters of folk psychological discourse. We always 
speak about our pains, perceptions, anxieties, and other conscious experiences. Since, as we 
saw, the existence of conscious experiences and their phenomenal nature does not raise any 
doubts, our folk psychological speech is, at least in this respect, completely in order. 
 
Let’s see (2). Of course, mental antirealists do not deny the existence of conscious 
experiences. According to them, the class of mental entities is wider than the class of 
conscious experiences. It also contains propositional attitudes (e.g.: beliefs), which are not 
necessarily conscious. 
 
The difference is the following. Let’s take, for instance, pain as a conscious experience. To 
have a pain is to actually experience this pain, where this experience is like something for the 
subject. This experience has temporal parts; it begins at some point (even if its actual borders 
are vague), it lasts for some time and it terminates at some point (even if its actual borders are 
vague here as well). Concerning its metaphysical status therefore, it is, as we noted earlier, an 
event. Let’s take, on the other hand, the propositional attitude that is belief. To have a belief is 
not to experience it, as in the case of pain. We can have a belief even if we are not actually 
thinking about it, that is, it does not appear to us in a certain way, i.e. it is not phenomenally 
conscious. Moreover, we can have beliefs which we have never thought of. For example, 
neither of us has ever thought that we live farther from Singapore than from Teheran, though 
both of us have this belief. So, concerning its metaphysical status, a belief is not an event, 
because we do not undergo it. It seems plausible to claim that a belief is some property of 
ours; some dispositional property which can be manifested under certain circumstances.
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It is reasonable now to say that there is a difference in metaphysical category between our 
conscious experiences and the kind of propositional attitudes such as a belief. The former are 
occurrent events (they have temporal parts), while the latter ones are non-occurrent 
dispositional or other properties (whilst to have one can be a state). Moreover, conscious 
events depend heavily on actual experiences, regarding their existence (they are esse est 
percipi type entities), while propositional attitudes are rather theoretical entities. 
 
Most importantly, only the former ones can be called ‘mental’ in a fundamental and primary 
sense. According to our natural conviction, if a system or an organism, be it as complicated as 
you like, does not have any conscious experiences, that is, it does not undergo events that are 
something it is like for it to undergo, and so the world does not appear to it in any way, then 
we tend to treat this system or organism as an automat without a mental life. This conviction 
cannot be changed by the fact that we can explain its behaviour with the help of attributing 
propositional attitudes to it. Think about the following well-known sentences: „the mousetrap 
perceives the mouse and slaps”, „the molecules aim to an equilibrium”, „Deep Blue wants to 
capture Kasparov’s queen”, etc. 
 
If we accept the view that conscious experiences constitute the paradigmatic cases of the 
‘mental’, we only have two choices. Either we claim that “the mind is made up entirely of 
occurrent states and conscious processes” (Gertler 2007, 201, italics in original), so we deny 
that our beliefs, non-occurrent desires, etc. are mental. Or, we claim that “other mental states 
[beside conscious experiences] count as mental only when, and insofar as, they bear the right 
relationship to phenomenally intentional states” (Horgan – Kriegel 2008, 60.). For instance, 
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 The difference between ‘non-occurrent and occurrent entities’ is naturally not the same as the difference 
between ’propositional attitudes and non-propositional mental entities’. A conscious experience can eventually 
have propositional nature; S actually desires to p, S actually thinks that p, and so on. 
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“Some states have fairly immediate causal/inferential connections to phenomenally 
intentional states, and those will qualify strongly as mental states” (Horgan – Kriegel 2008, 
62.). If we accept this latter conception, then we should say that non-conscious states “would 
fall into a grey area where their mental-state status would be vague” (Horgan – Kriegel 2008, 
63.).  
 
Let’s take stock. Folk psychology is the discourse about the ‘mental’. It is plausible to claim 
that the paradigmatic cases of the ‘mental’ are conscious experiences. We can speak (if we 
can speak at all) of other mental entities only because they are related to it in some way. 
Consequently, since no sceptical considerations can be taken into account concerning 
conscious experiences, there is no serious argument against the realist interpretation of folk 
psychology. Mental fictionalism is an undermotivated theory. 
 
This can be made more specific. It is not that there are no sceptical arguments against the 
existence of conscious experiences, but, as Galen Strawon put it: “[conscious] experience is 
not only the first […] natural fact with which we are acquainted; it’s also the most certainly 
known natural fact.” (Strawson 1994/2010: xviii). So, maybe we can say the following: 
mental fictionalism is not just an undermotivated theory, but it is the least motivated version 
of fictionalism. As we see it, in the cases of all other, more or less motivated versions of 
fictionalism, there is an epistemological gap between us and the alleged subject matters of the 
discourse. In the case of abstract entities and possible worlds, even if they exist, we are 
causally isolated from them, so we have no appropriate evidence about their existence. In the 
case of moral properties and composite physical objects, our evidences causally 
underdetermine their existence. All of our experiences can be the same without them. In 
contrast to all of this, we have the most certain evidence about our conscious experiences and 
we are in the most direct causal relationship with these. 
 
This is not the end of the story. The mental fictionalist can argue in the following way: in 
order to decide between the realist and the fictionalist interpretations of folk psychology, we 
have to consider the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches in all their complexity 
and generality, too (see: Yablo 2001). The existence or non-existence of mental entities is just 
one element in this matrix. Alluding to this, the mental fictionalist can say that her motivation 
does not necessarily rely on the doubts about the subject matter of folk psychology, but on the 
weaknesses of folk psychological explanations. To wit, these explanations are wrong; they 
cannot describe the role of mental entities in our mental economy correctly. In other words, 
folk psychology is not wrong about the phenomenology of our mental life, that is, about  
judging how mental phenomena seems to the subject or about what kind of mental entities 
there are, but about how the mind works. Since the adherent of the realist interpretation takes 
folk psychological explanations about the working of the mind at face value, she is committed 
to false explanations, which is obviously a disadvantage of her interpretation. In contrast, the 
mental fictionalist can preserve the folk psychological discourse without taking these 
explanations at face value, because she thinks that we do not assert the sentences of these 
explanations. So, mental fictionalism can be well-motivated in this way.  
 
For example, following Ryle and Wittgenstein, the fictionalist can say that the causal 
explanations of folk psychology are wrong, because Hume’s dictum for the logical-conceptual 
independency of the relata of causal relations is not satisfied here. We cannot individuate a 
mental state without alluding to the behavioural pattern and to other mental states which 
standardly go hand in hand with it. Folk psychology therefore represents the real causal 
processes behind our behaviour, that is, the real mental processes falsely. 
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Or, following Davidson, the fictionalist can claim the following: according to folk 
psychology, we attribute mental states to our fellows and to ourselves with the help of the 
norms of ideal rationality. However, rationality is normative; it refers to what kind of beliefs 
or desires a subject has to have in order to make her behaviour meaningful according to some 
principles of ideal rationality. Consequently, all of this has nothing to do with the actual 
processes of the subject’s mind. In other words: propositional attitudes and physical states 
have different identity conditions. The former ones can be determined by the constitutive 
principles of ideal rationality, while the latter ones can be determined by the constitutive 
principles of empirical generalization. Therefore, folk psychology introduces entities in its 
explanations in a way that violates an important methodological requirement of empirical 
science. 
 
Moreover, the principle of ideal rationality does not only govern the attributions of mental 
states, but also the interpretations of those very behaviours which are supposed to be 
explained by these states. As Demeter puts it: „It seems that behavioural patterns cannot be 
identified without the mental states that are supposed to be ascribed on their basis. […] 
Classifying behaviour, i.e. which bodily movement counts as an action and is relevant to 
which mental states, belongs to the realm of folk psychology. […] [D]ifferent interpretations 
reveal different behavioural patterns” (Demeter 2009; see also Dennett 1991, 49.). This leads 
to serious trouble: the observed behaviours cannot constitute independent evidence to the 
explanations of folk psychology. These explanations therefore also violate an all-important 
methodological requirement of empirical science. 
 
These are well-known and much debated features of folk psychological explanations, and we 
think that some of them could be plausible in the case of non-conscious, non-occurrent 
propositional attitudes. From the alleged fallacy of these kinds of explanations, you may argue 
in the following way: “In these explanations propositional attitudes play a crucial role, and 
some of them may be non-conscious or non-occurrent ones. Moreover, our only reason to 
postulate these non-conscious propositional attitudes is the fact that they take part in folk 
psychological explanations. However, these types of explanations draw a bad picture of the 
real causal pattern of our behaviour, so we have good reason to doubt the existence of non-
conscious, non-occurrent propositional attitudes. Nevertheless, for one reason or another, we 
do not want to give up talking about non-conscious beliefs and desires; maybe this would be 
explicitly impossible. So, contrary to your argument, it is reasonable to accept a limited form 
of mental fictionalism, one that is restricted to the part of folk psychology that concerns non-
conscious, non-occurrent propositional attitudes.” 
 
We do not think this reply has much plausibility. As we mentioned above, we think non-
conscious, non-occurrent propositional attitudes could count as mental phenomena only if 
they bear some proper relation to conscious events. Our argument depends on the fact that 
you cannot doubt the existence of conscious events. So, if you can explicate the proper 
relationship which connect non-conscious attitudes to conscious experiences, then you cannot 
doubt the existence of those attitudes, too. For example, if you think that non-occurrent 
propositional attitudes are non-occurrent precisely because they are dispositional properties, 
the manifestations of which are conscious events and vice versa: some conscious events are 
manifestations of non-conscious attitudes, then why would you doubt the existence of the 
latter? In other words, it is implausible to claim that the only reason to believe in the existence 
of non-conscious propositional attitudes is that they play their role in bad folk psychological 
explanations. 
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Of course, you can insist that non-conscious, non-occurent propositional attitudes can be 
postulated independently of their relation to conscious experiences, so it is indeed reasonable 
to doubt their existence and be fictionalist about them. But then it would not be mental 
fictionalism. Therefore, we have no quarrel with it, as we have no quarrel with ‘thermostat-
state fictionalism’, which claims that we use the discourse of the propositional attitudes of 
thermostats only fictionally. 
 
In contrast to the case of non-conscious propositional attitudes, in the case of occurrent, event-
like conscious experiences, none of the explanatory weakness mentioned above are plausible. 
Simply due to the fact that they are actual, non-dispositional entities with determinate 
temporal properties, they can be individuated without reference to any behaviour or other 
mental states, and simply because there is something it is like to undergo them, they can be 
directly observed without the help of some constitutive principle. 
 
Let’s take pain as our example once more. In the case of pain, neither of the suspect features 
mentioned above have any plausibility. (1) Since we directly experience pain, the ‘attribution’ 
of it does not require any rational or other constitutive principle or theoretical consideration. 
(2) Furthermore, if due to pain someone makes a snatch at the suffering part of her body, then 
an event (the feeling of pain) causes another (the movement of the hand). This is quite 
simple; there is no logical or conceptual connection between the felt pain and the movement 
of the limb. (3) And finally, purely due to this conceptual independency, the individuation of 
the observed behaviour is absolutely independent from that of the pain which causes it; from 
any other mental states; and from any constitutive principle (except the ones which govern 
perceptual experiences). Of course, you can describe the bodily movement as some kind of 
pain-behaviour (in some cases this will be rather mannered), and you can establish the logical-
conceptual connection with this manoeuvre, but this can be done with every causal 
relationship. What matters is that you can give an adequate description of the behaviour that is 
free from any reference to the pain itself, or to other mental states. 
 
Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that the mental fictionalist will give us other, 
more plausible arguments against the realist interpretation of folk psychology, but we cannot 
see any possibility to doubt the existence of the subject matter of folk psychology, just as we 
cannot think that explanations and descriptions of this discourse raise such serious problems 
that we would have good reason to abandon the realist interpretation.
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